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LEGISLATION
COMMENTS ON SELECTED SECTIONS OF THE 1954
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE-A SYMPOSIUM
DIVIDEND CREDIT AND EXCLUSION
I
Under the present tax laws corporate profits are allegedly taxed
twice, once in the form of income to the corporation, and again in the
form of dividend-income to the stockholder.' Section 34, which allows
a credit against tax equal to 4% of dividends received, and Section
116, which permits the exclusion of the first $50 of dividend income,
were inserted in the 1954 Code to alleviate this "double taxation."
Those favoring passage of the new sections argued that the measures
were at least a step in the direction of eliminating this burden.2 They
also pointed to the dangers inherent in the disproportionate reliance
by business on non-equity financing, precipitated by this oppressive
treatment of dividend income.3
In taking the opposite position, opponents of the new provisions
reasoned that the admittedly burdensome taxation of corporate earn-
ings should merely be looked upon as an added cost of doing business
in the corporate form.4 In their view, the corporation and the stock-
holder were two separate entities,5 and therefore there was no ap-
parent, much less real, "double taxation." Accordingly, Sections 34
and 116 were not alleviating an unjust tax burden, but were in effect
giving preferential tax treatment to a select group,6 by favoring un-
earned dividend income over earned income.7 Apart from the ques-
' 100 Cong. Rec. 8540 (June 28, 1954) (statement by Hon. Eugene D.
Millikin, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, on bringing H.R. 8300
to the Senate floor for debate).
2 100 Cong. Rec. 11759 (July 28, 1954) (statement by Hon. Daniel A.
Reed, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, regarding the
Conference Report on H.R. 8300).
3 See note 1 supra. Interest paid on its bonds is deductible by the corpo-
ration under Section 163, whereas dividends paid on its stock are not deductible.
Hence, corporations rely to a larger extent on debt financing, than on equity
financing, in order to escape the tax imposed on dividends.
4 See STANLEY AND KILCULLEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 19 (Pamphlet No. 1,
1954).
5 Ibid. See 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 9.01 (1942).
6 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. B7 (1954) (Minority Re-
port on H.R. 8300).
7 Ibid. Prior to 1943, "earned income" was given preferential tax treat-
ment in order to grant relief to taxpayers in the small income brackets. "The
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tion of loss of revenue, they opposed the measures as representing a
basic change in our tax philosophy, i.e., a shift from taxing according
to one's ability to pay, to relieving those in the high income brackets
and burdening those who are least able to bear it.8
The granting of tax relief to dividend income is not an innova-
tion in the law of taxation. Canada has provided such relief since
1949,9 while England has granted it for over 100 years.10 Until 1936
there was little or no need for such relief in the United States, since
dividend income was substantially tax free. Although dividends were
included in gross income,1 ' dividends received by an individual were
exempt from normal tax.12  The Revenue Act of 1936 eliminated this
individual exemption but permitted corporate stockholders a credit of
up to 85%o of dividends received, when computing the corporation's
normal tax.13 Under a similar provision in the present Code, cor-
porate stockholders are permitted a deduction of -up to 85% of divi-
dends received from taxable domestic corporations 14 and from certain
foreign corporations.15 Prior to the 1954 Code, individual stock-
holders were taxed on the full amount of dividends received, since
their pre-war exemption had been taken away and never restored.
This led to the recent demand for relief from "double taxation" of
dividend income which culminated in the passage of Sections 34 and
116, which are perhaps the most controversial measures in the new
Code.
Effective with respect to taxable years ending after July 31, 1954,
an individual stockholder is allowed a credit against tax of 4% of
dividends received after July 31, 1954 from domestic corporations and
included in gross income. However, the credit is limited to the lesser
of the following amounts: (1) the total tax due for the taxable year
as reduced by the foreign tax credit; 16 or (2) 4% of the taxable
income for the taxable year.17 It is to be noted that dividends ex-
1924, 1926 and 1928 Acts contained a 25% tax credit for earned income, but
the 1932 Act eliminated this feature of the Revenue Act. The 1934 Act re-
instated the earned income credit, and it was thereafter retained in the 1936
and 1938 Acts and the original enactment of the Internal Revenue Code. How-
ever, the Treasury Department finally recommended the repeal of the earned
income credit, and its repeal by the 1943 Act apparently rang an everlasting
death knell with respect to such a credit." 5 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 32.03 (1953).
8 See note 6 supra.
9 See P-H 1954 IRC VOL p. 24,011.
10 See note 2 supra.
"Revenue Act of 1934, § 2 2 (a), 48 STAT. 686 (1934).
12 Revenue Act of 1934, §25(a) (1), 48 STAT. 692 (1934).
3Revenue Act of 1936, §26(b), 49 STAT. 1664 (1936).
'4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 243.
'L Id. § 245.
'6 Id. § 34(b) (1).
17Id. § 34(b) (2) (B). For taxable years ending before January 1955, the
credit is limited to 2% of taxable income. Id. § 34(b) (2) (A).
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cluded from gross income under Section 116 do not enter into the
computation of the credit. The credit is also disallowed in the case
of taxpayers who report their income on Form 1040A, in which the
tax is computed by the Secretary or his delegate. 18
An individual stockholder may exclude from gross income the
first $50 of dividends received from domestic corporations in a taxable
year ending after July 31, 1954. Where a husband and wife each
own stock, both are entitled to the exclusion (i.e., $50 each) whether
they file joint or separate returns.
Since the dividend credit and exclusion were intended to elim-
inate double taxation, they only apply to situations in which double
taxation would occur. 19 Thus, in order for a dividend to qualify it
must: (1) come from a corporation which is subject to the ordinary
corporate tax, and (2) constitute a distribution which is taxable to
the stockholder.20 The credit and exclusion, therefore, are disallowed
in the case of dividends from life insurance companies, China Trade
Act Corporations, 21 tax exempt charitable organizations, tax exempt
farmers' cooperative associations 2 2 and corporations engaged in busi-
ness within the possessions of the United States governed by Section
931.28 Dividends from foreign corporations are also ineligible. In-
terest payments, in the form of "dividends" from mutual savings
banks, cooperative banks and domestic building and loan associations
which are withdrawable on demand, do not qualify,2 4 since they are
deducted by the organizations themselves.2 5 Similarly, dividends from
mutual insurance companies (other than mutual marine and mutual
fire insurance companies issuing perpetual policies) are treated as a
return of capital and therefore ineligible.2 6 Finally, the credit and
exclusion are denied to those nonresident aliens who are not subject
to the regular income tax, but who are taxed instead under Section
871 (a) .27
Special rules have been formulated to cover partial interest cases
and other problematical areas. In instances where the dividends are
received by an estate or trust, the credit is allowed to the estate or
-s Id. § 6014.
19 See P-H 1954 IRC VOL p. 24,010.
20 Accordingly, the credit and exclusion do not apply to nontaxable dividends.
However, taxable cash, property or constructive dividends, taxable stock divi-
dends, taxable stock and bond rights, and certain liquidation dividends
and stock redemptions qualify, if received from a corporation which is subject
to the regular corporate tax. The new Code retains the general rule for
determining the taxability of a corporate distribution. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 301(c).21Id. §§34(c)(2), 116(b)(2).2 2 Id. §§ 34(c) (3) (A), 116(b) (3) (A).
23 Id. §§ 34(c) (3) (B), 116(b) (3) (B).2 4Id. §§34(d) (1), 116(c) (1).
25 Id. § 591.
26 Id. §§ 34(c) (1), 116(b) (1).27 Id. §§34(e), 116(d).
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trust only in respect to that portion of the dividend which is not
properly allocable to any beneficiary.28 The proportionate share of
each participant in the amount of dividends received by a common
trust fund is, for the purposes of Sections 34 and 116, considered as
having been received by the participant.29 Where the dividend is
received by a partnership, the dividends are apportioned among the
partners.3 0 Dividends received from regulated investment companies
are eligible to the extent that such dividends represent a distribution
by the company of dividends received from corporations in which it
has invested. The remaining portion of the dividend is a capital gain
dividend and consequently does not qualify.3 '
Sections 34 and 116 will cause an estimated loss of revenue total-
ing 204 million dollars,3 2 with a corresponding saving to 7,100,000
stockholder-taxpayers.3 3  The percentage of increase in the after-tax
yield of dividend income will be comparatively small in the low income
brackets, but will be rather sizable in the high income brackets.
Under the old Code, for example, a taxpayer in the 20% bracket
receiving $100 taxable dividend income would have an after-tax yield
of $80. With the new 4% credit against tax, he will have an after-
tax yield of $84, an increase in yield of 5%. A taxpayer in the
91% bracket receiving $100 in taxable dividend income formerly re-
ceived only $9 in after-tax dividend yield. As a result of the 4%
credit, his after-tax yield will now be $13, an increase of 44.4%.34
281 d. § 642(a) (3).
29 Id. § 584(c) (2 ).
30Id. § 702(a) (5).
31 Id. §§ 34(d) (2), 116(c) (2). If the dividends received by the investment
company constitute more than 75% of its gross income, the investment com-
pany's stockholders may apply the credit and exclusion to the entire amount
of dividends received by them. Id. § 854(b) (1). The investment company is
required to notify its stockholders as to the amount which may be taken into
account as dividends for the purposes of Sections 34 and 116, through a written
notice mailed not later than 30 days after the closing of its taxable year.
Id. § 854(b) (2).
32 See note 2 sipra.
33 See 100 Cong. Rec. 8537 (June 28, 1954) (statement by Hon. Eugene D.
Millikin, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, on bringing H.R. 8300
to the Senate floor for debate). Nevertheless, as pointed out by the Minority
Report on H.R. 8300, 92% of American families own no stock, while six-tenths
of 1% of the population own 80% of all publicly held stock. See note 6 supra.
Therefore, it is debatable whether the sections benefit the average taxpayer or
unduly favor those in the higher income brackets. However, some relief may
be justifiable and necessary in the case of small, closely-held corporations, in
which the stockholders devote much of their time to the business of the cor-
poration. Since this type of business organization is commonly utilized by
small independent businessmen, remedial legislation in this area would not be
open to the criticism that it favors a particular class or gives preferential
treatment to unearned income.
34 In these examples it is assumed that the taxpayer receiving $100 under
the new Code has already taken his $50 exclusion. Therefore, the exclusion
aspect is not considered. See P-H 1954 IRC VOL. 1 23,005 (This paragraph
also includes an interesting analysis of the comparative tax advantages of
1955]
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Apart from savings which will accrue from the normal operation
of the statute, a stockholder may take advantage of the new provisions
through affirmative action. Thus he might find it profitable to borrow
money to invest in stock, since the interest payable on the loan is tax
deductible, and the dividends received on the stock are eligible for the
tax credit and exclusion.35 It may also prove worthwhile to buy stock
prior to the dividend-record-date and to sell it immediately after the
ex-dividend date. The dividends received would qualify for the credit
and exclusion, and the stockholder would also have a short-term cap-
ital loss, resulting from the sale of the stock after its market value
had declined due to the payment of the dividend.36
Although the relief granted under these sections is comparatively
small, their enactment may foreshadow the return of substantially
tax-free dividends and may encourage, to some degree, the use of
equity capital.
CORPORATE ORGANIZATION
By the enactment of two provisions, Sections 351 and 248, the
new Code has attempted to simplify certain tax problems which con-
front the organizers of a corporation. Each of these sections is de-
signed to eliminate an area of confusion which had existed under the
prior law.
Under the 1939 Code, as under the 1954 Code, the organizers
of a corporation who transferred property to it were permitted, under
certain circumstances, to acquire the corporate stock without incurring
tax liability. For the transaction to enjoy tax-free status, however,
the 1939 Code required that the stock be received by the organizers
in substantially the same relative proportion as was the value of the
property each had transferred to the corporation. If this "propor-
tionate interest" did not exist, a gain or loss was recognized on the
part of the organizer receiving a larger or smaller relative interest in
the distributed securities than he had in the transferred property.'
capital gains transactions and taxable and non-taxable bonds as compared with
dividends eligible for the exclusion and credit.).
35 See Zack, How the New Code Will Affect te Individual Taxpayer,
98 J. AccouNTANcY 294, 296 (1954).
36 Ibid.
L INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 112(b) (5). Under this section, as under the
1954 Internal Revenue Code, Section 351 (a), the transaction is not tax-free
unless the transferors are in control of the corporation immediately after the
transfer. In the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, Section 368(c), control is
defined as ". . . the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at
least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of
the corporation." This definition was carried over from the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code, Section 112(h).
[ VOL. 29
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Considerable litigation ensued in an effort to determine whether or not
such a proportionate interest existed in specific situations. Two dif-
ferent tests were applied in an effort to settle the question. 2 According
to the "control" test, that percentage of all the transferred property
which each organizer contributed was compared to the percentage of
stock he received in all the stock distributed. Then, the difference in
the percentages, if any, was compared to the differences which oc-
curred in the case of the other organizers, to ascertain whether there
was any substantial variance in the respective percentages. If there
was, the requisite proportionate interest did not exist, and the transfer
was taxable.3 Under the "relative value" test, on the other hand, the
value of the property transferred by each organizer is compared with
the value of property received by him. If a difference exists in any
one instance, it is compared with the difference, if any, that existed
in the receipt by the other organizer or organizers. This would re-
sult in a spread, which, if substantial, would cause the transaction to
lose its tax-free status.4
The uncertainty engendered by the proportionate interest re-
quirement has been eliminated, ostensibly at least, by Section 351 of
the 1954 Code. The new section abandons the former approach to
the problem, and seeks to base the tax upon the real nature of the
transaction. Thus, where two or more organizers transfer property
to a corporation, and one of them receives all the stock, no gain or
loss will be recognized. If, however, the transfer is a subterfuge to
conceal a gift or a payment for services from one organizer to an-
other, it will result in tax liability.5
2 See 2 CCH 1955 FED. TAx RFP. 2503.17.
3 See Ared Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1080 (1934) (decided under
Revenue Act of 1926, which employed the same language as the 1939 Code) ;
see Hartford-Empire Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1943)
(decided under Revenue Act of 1932, which was also similar to the 1939 Code
provision). The operation of the "control" test may be illustrated by the fol-
lowing example: A and B, the only organizers of a corporation, each con-
tributed $10,000 to the corporation; A received back $20,000 in stock and B
received back $15,000 in stock. A has received 57% of the total stock although
he only contributed 50% of the total property. Conversely, B has only received
43% of the stock. Coupling A's gain of 7% with B's loss of 7%, it becomes
apparent that there is a spread of 14%. If this spread were regarded by the
court as indicative of a substantial disproportion, A would be taxed on a gain
of $5,000, this being the monetary value of the disproportion.
4 See Bodell v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 407 (1st Cir. 1946) ; United Carbon
Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1937) (decided under Revenue Act
of 1926, which employed the same language as the 1939 Code). If, in the same
example used in note 3 mtpra, the "relative value" test were employed, account
would be taken of the fact that A made a profit of 100% on the entire trans-
action, while B only made a profit of 50%. The spread between the two would
therefore be 50% according to the "relative value" test, although it was only
14% according to the "control" test.
5 See H.R. REP'. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A117 (1954); SEx. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1954).
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While Section 351 is a praiseworthy effort to simplify the Code,
the practical value of the change can only be judged after the new
provision has been litigated. Until then, the possibility remains that
the new section will be construed in such a fashion that it will be
quite as constricting as the former law. Indeed, it is difficult to en-
vision a situation in which the organizers would receive widely dis-
proportionate returns on their contributions, without a taxable gift or
payment for services being made, in fact, from one of them to the
other.6
Another provision, Section 248, corrects injustices which had
existed in reference to the deduction of organizational expenses from
taxable income. Under previous law, the regulations had provided
that the expenses of organizing a corporation were capital expendi-
tures, and therefore were not deductible from gross income.7 Attor-
neys' and accountants' fees, for example, were disallowed as business
deductions because they were incident to corporate organization.8
However, prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, the law recognized
a single exception to the general rule that organizational expenses
were not deductible. In the case of a corporation chartered for a
term of years, it had been held that such expenditures might be
amortized over the period of the corporate life,9 notwithstanding the
possibility that the charter might be renewed and the life of the cor-
poration prolonged.
Under the new Code, the corporation chartered in perpetuity is
allowed, at its election, to treat organizational expenses as deferred
expenditures over a period of five years or more.10 The expenses
must be of such a nature, however, that they would have been amor-
tizable under prior law if the corporation had been chartered for a
term."1 Commissions paid in connection with the sale of stock, for
instance, were not amortizable even by a corporation with a limited
life, since such expenses did not result in any increase of exhaustible
6 See Darrell, Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations Under the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, 32 TAXES 1007, 1008 (1954). Section 351 was
undoubtedly intended to apply to newly organized corporations. By its terms,
however, it also encompasses a transfer to an existing corporation by two or
more individuals in return for corporate securities. In such a situation it would
seem even less likely that a substantially disproportionate return on the trans-
action would be regarded by the Commissioner as anything other than a gift
from one organizer to another.
7 U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24(a)-2, 2 P-H 1954 FED. TAX SERv. 11,091-a
(1953).
8 Clarence Whitman & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1192 (1928);
see Appeal of F. Tinker & Sons Co., 1 B.T.A. 799, 803 (1925).
9 Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1930). Sub-
sequently, however, the Board of Tax Appeals declined to follow the Hershey
case. See Wisconsin Land & Lumber Co., 1 P-H 1928-1932 BTA MEm. DEc.
32,239 (1932).
10 INT. Rzv. CODE oF 1954, § 248 (a). The time and method of making the
election is prescribed in U.S. Treas. Temp. Rules, 7, 19 Fed. Reg. 5497 (1954).
II See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A64 (1954).
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capital assets.1 2 Accordingly, they will not be deductible under
Section 248.
Section 248 eliminates the previously existing bias toward the
relatively few corporations which are chartered for a term of years,
by extending the same tax treatment to all corporations. More im-
portant, however, is its realistic appraisal of organizational expenses
as outlays incident to the conduct of a business. By permitting them
to be deducted as amortizable expenses, the new Code recognizes the
actual nature of such expenditures, especially in the situation where
many corporations are employed in the operation of what is essentially
a single enterprise.
RECEIPT OF STOCK DIVIDENDS
The power of Congress to tax the receipt of cash or property
dividends is well established, but in the past considerable doubt ex-
isted as to its power to tax a stock dividend.' The question presented
was whether the receipt of such dividend constituted taxable income.
Only recently has it been argued by some that a tax on the receipt
of stock dividends would not be declared unconstitutional. 2 Despite
this view, however, the receipt of a stock dividend, with minor ex-
ceptions,3 is exempted from tax by the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.4
The Revenue Act of 1913 taxed dividends in general but made
no specific reference to stock dividends.5 An attempt by the Com-
missioner to tax such dividends was frustrated by the Supreme Court
in Towne v. Eisner 6 where it was held that stock dividends were not
"income" within the meaning of the Act. However, in the Revenue
Act of 1916,7 a clause was inserted which expressly taxed stock divi-
dends. Under this Act, a second attempt was made to tax stock divi-
12 Surety Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1935) ; Barbour
Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1934).
' See PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CoRrORATIONs 603
(2d ed. 1949).
2 See Lowndes, The Taxation of Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96
U. OF PA. L. REv. 147, 149 (1947); Rottschaefer, Present Taxable Status of
Stock Dividends in Federal Tax Law, 28 MINN. L. REv. 163, 192 (1944).
3 Distributions are taxable when they are in lieu of money, i.e., ". . . in
discharge of preference dividends for the taxable year of the corporation in
which the distribution is made or for the preceding taxable year . . " or
where the shareholder has an election to receive the distribution in money or
stock. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 305 (b).
4' ".. . [G]ross income does not include the amount of any distribution
made by a corporation to its shareholders, with respect to the stock of such
corporation, in its stock or in rights to acquire its stock." Id. § 305 (a).
538 STAT. 167 (1913).
6245 U.S. 418 (1918).
7 39 STAT. 757 (1916).
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dends, in the celebrated Eisner v. Macomber case.8  The Court held,
however, that the Revenue Act of 1916 was unconstitutional in so far
as it taxed stock dividends. The decision was based on the nature
of a stock dividend 9 in relation to the concept of "income" as used in
the Sixteenth Amendment.' ° In ascertaining the nature of a stock
dividend, the Court concluded that nothing of value is received by the
shareholder. By the very nature of a stock dividend, no gain is de-
rived from the shareholder's investment capable of being severed from
the corporation and put to the stockholder's own use."'
The Macomber case was broadly interpreted by the Congress
and, as a result, when the Revenue Act of 1921 was enacted, all stock
dividends were exempted from income tax.12
Sixteen years later, in a series of cases beginning with Koshland
v. Helvering,13 the Supreme Court held that a stock dividend was
income where the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corpora-
tion was altered by the distribution. In the Koshland case, a holder
of preferred stock received voting common stock, giving him new
voting rights in the corporation. 14 Receipt of this stock dividend was
considered income even though the shareholder's assets remained in
the corporation. Thus the narrow concept of "income" expounded
in Eisner v. Macomber was expanded by the Koshland case.
Soon after the Koshland case was decided, the Revenue Act of
1936 15 became law. Pursuant to that Act, stock dividends were
exempted to the extent that they did not ".... constitute income to the
shareholder within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment .. " 16
8252 U.S. 189 (1920). The case was decided by a divided Court, Justices
Holmes and Brandeis each writing a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Day
and Clarke respectively. It was promptly criticized by the majority of law
review writers of the day. The articles are cited in Helvering v. Griffiths, 318
U.S. 371, 373 n.4 (1943).
9 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 208-212 (1920).
3 0Id. at 206-208.
11 The shareholder, in reality, merely receives evidence of his newly adjusted
interest in the corporation. The Court regarded the stock dividend as the final
stage in a plan which enabled the corporation to retain surplus assets while
it seemingly distributed those assets to its shareholders. The plan is to pay
for additional stock out of surplus and distribute this stock to shareholders as
a dividend. Each shareholder owns no more than he owned prior to distribu-
tion. Nor is value received, since the shareholder's assets are still subject to
the corporation's control. See note 9 supra. For various definitions of income,
see SURnY AND WAP.NZ, FFDERAL INcOME TAXATION 185-196 (1954).
1242 STAT. 228 (1921).
13298 U.S. 441 (1936). See Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943);
Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937).
14 "A stock dividend may change the stockholders' proportionate interests
because it effects a change in: (1) voting rights; (2) participation in profits;
(3) priorities to assets on liquidation; or (4) proportionate ownership of the
corporation." Lowndes, The Taxation of Stock Dividends and Stock Rights,
96 U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 147, 150 (1947).
15 49 STAT. 1648 (1936).
1649 STAT. 1688 (1936).
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With the disappearance of the unqualified freedom from taxation
previously enjoyed by stock dividends, and in light of the inroads
made on the Macomber rule by the proportionate interest cases, the
Treasury Department thought the time was ripe in 1943 for a direct
attack on the exemption of stock dividends. It was believed that the
complexion of the Supreme Court had changed to the extent that
Eisner v. Macomber would not be followed if a similar case were
presented.17 In Helvering v. Griffiths 18 an attempt was made to tax
a distribution of common stock to holders of common. Again, the
stock dividend was held non-taxable but this time the decision was not
based on constitutional grounds. Discussion of the nature of a stock
dividend in relation to the meaning of "income" was conspicuously
absent. The stock dividend was held not taxable on the sole ground
that Congress had not declared it taxable. It was intimated that had
Congress expressly imposed a tax on stock dividends a contrary result
would have been reached.19
It is possible that stock dividends no longer enjoy tax exemption
on constitutional grounds.20 In that event, it would appear that the
exemption given them by Congress in the 1954 Code is a limitation
which the Government has imposed upon itself. The reason for this
exemption may be that the tax is merely postponed.
In addition to reaffirming the Macomber rule, the new Code has
overturned the line of cases which held that stock dividends were
taxable where the distribution altered the shareholder's proportionate
interest in the corporation. It is submitted that the change is an im-
provement. The shareholder's changed proportionate interest does
not seem to be a logical basis of distinction between taxable and non-
taxable stock dividends.21 In reality, the shareholder realizes no gain
whether his interest is altered or not. In the usual case the changed
proportionate interest, and the new rights that accompany it, mean
little to the shareholder. Again, the stock dividend does not increase
the shareholder's assets nor relieve his funds from the hazards of
corporate use. Thus it would appear that where a stock dividend is
distributed it is the realization of a profit on sale that is important
to the shareholder. The 1954 Code has, accordingly, postponed the
imposition of the tax until the sale or similar disposition of the stock.22
17 See, e.g., PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONs 603 n.1 (2d ed. 1949).15318 U.S. 371 (1943).
19 "Of course, if there were an adequate basis in statute and regulation for
the tax in question, it is difficult to understand why its collection should be
regarded as 'harassing.' . . . [W]e may well inquire why the legislation should
not precede the judicial decision." Id. at 404.
20 See note 2 supra.
21 See Lowndes, The Taxation of Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96
U. OF PA. L. Rv. 147, 155-157 (1947) for a general discussion of this view.
22 See Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau and Warren, The Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954: Corporate Distributions, Organizatims and Reorganizations,
68 HARv. L. REv. 393, 405 (1955).
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GOVERNMENT-INsuRED LOANS
Congressional investigations during the past year have focused
public attention upon scandals associated with the Federal Housing
Administration.' Bold headlines revealed the multi-million dollar
profits realized by builders capitalizing on a "loosely-written law." 2
This problem had its genesis during the acute postwar housing short-
age when, in an attempt to alleviate this condition, Congress enacted
legislation providing for government-insured mortgage loans.3
A variety of devices were soon employed to take advantage of
the shortcomings of the law. The most popular device was to apply
for a sizeable government-insured mortgage loan, build an apartment
project for less than the loan, and declare a dividend on the excess
amount.4 Since the difference between the amount of the insured
mortgage and the actual cost of the housing project did not represent
payments from earnings and profits, and since proceeds of a loan are
not income, the dividends paid out of this sum were not taxable as
ordinary dividends.5
The shocking revelations of tremendous windfall profits moved
Congress to utilize tax legislation as a deterrent to such sharp prac-
tices. Undoubtedly the most direct remedy would have been to
strengthen the federal housing legislation and to provide for more
stringent enforcement of existing regulations. Congress, however,
decided to add Section 312(j) to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.6
The statute is grounded upon the principle that distributions from
earnings and profits are taxable to the shareholder as ordinary divi-
dends.7 When Section 312(j) is applicable, fictional earnings and
profits are created at the time of distribution. This is best illustrated
1 See Newsweek, Nov. 8, 1954, p. 28, col. 1; Time, Oct. 18, 1954, p. 19,
col. 2; U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 22, 1954 p. 35, col. 1.
2 See U.S. News & World Report, supra note 1, at p. 40, col. 3.
3 Ibid.
4 See Newsweek, supra note 1, at col. 2.
5 Government attempts to tax these distributions as ordinary dividends have
not met with success. See George M. Gross, 23 T.C. - (1955).6 "(j) DIsTIBuTION OF PROCEEDS OF LoAN INSURED BY THE UNITED
STATES.-
(1) IN GwER-.Ai-If a corporation distributes property with respect to its
stock, and if, at the time of the distribution-
(A) there is outstanding a loan to such corporation which was made,
guaranteed, or insured by the United States (or by any agency or instru-
mentality thereof), and
(B) the amount of such loan so outstanding exceeds the adjusted basis
of the property constituting security for such loan,
then the earnings and profits of the corporation shall be increased by the
amount of such excess. ....
(2) EFrrcTIvE DATE.-Paragraph (1) shall apply only with respect to
distributions made on or after June 22, 1954."
7 See 3 P-H 1955 FED. TAX SERv. f 34,048.
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by a hypothetical. A corporation receives a government-insured
mortgage loan of $1,000,000 and erects an apartment house at the
cost of $900,000. It thereupon distributes the $100,000 difference to
its shareholders. This amount is not earnings and profits. Section
312(j), however, declares that just prior to such distribution the
earnings and profits are increased by the amount of the difference
between the loan and the adjusted basis.8 Thus, this distribution
will be from earnings and profits, by use of this statutory fiction, and
as such will be taxable as ordinary dividends. Immediately after this
distribution the earnings and profits will be decreased by the amount
added, that is, $100,000. 9
The regulations issued by the Treasury Department indicate that
such decrease will not reduce the earnings and profits below zero.10
Thus, the distribution in the above hypothetical would not cause a
deficit against which future earnings and profits could be charged.
If in the second year the corporation realized actual earnings and
profits of $50,000, this amount would not be charged against a
$100,000 deficit. If there is a distribution of this $50,000, the divi-
dends are taxable as ordinary dividends.
A more difficult problem is presented by distributions, other than
from earnings and profits, made by the corporation after it has dis-
tributed its loan excess. For example, during the first year a cor-
poration has distributed $100,000, the difference between the amount
of the loan and the adjusted basis. During the second year it dis-
tributes another $100,000, not from earnings and profits, but from
paid-in surplus. The proposed regulations construe the language of
the statute in such a manner that Section 312(j) would again apply
and the dividends would be taxable as ordinary dividends. Thus,
immediately prior to such distribution, the $100,000 difference between
the loan and the adjusted basis (if no part of the loan has been repaid)
would be added to the earnings and profits and the distribution would
be deemed derived from those earnings and profits and taxable at
this rate.1
The employment by Congress of its powers of taxation to correct
abuses arising in the administration of other laws and in the function-
ing of governmental agencies is at best questionable. The net result
is to make more complicated a field of law beset by complications of
its own. It is to be hoped, however, that this new section will serve
as an effective deterrent to the perpetration of similar frauds.
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312(j).
9 Ibid.
10 U.S. Treas. Temp. Rules, § 1.312-12, 19 Fed. Reg. 8252 (1954).
11 Ibid.
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SALE OF TREASURY STOCK
When a corporation sells shares of stock, whether it be formative
stock or non-formative, issued at some later date, no gain or loss is
recognized for tax purposes." In such matters it is of no consequence
that the stock was sold at a premium 2 or at a discount.3 In this re-
spect, the 1954 Code has not added anything new, but only reiterates
that which has long been recognized.
Unlike the sale of original stock, the law concerning the sale of
treasury stock has been conflicting and unclear. The difficulty arose
in determining whether or not a corporation realizes a taxable gain
or a deductible loss when it sells shares of its own stock that it had
previously reacquired from a stockholder. The 1939 Code contained
no specific provision pertaining to this problem, nor did any of the
previous revenue acts. The Commissioner, however, did make ap-
plicable provisions in the various tax regulations interpreting the dif-
ferent revenue acts and the 1939 Code. These provisions have in no
way been consistent.
The first such regulation, promulgated after the Revenue Act of
1916, made any gain accruing to a corporation from the sale of its
treasury stock taxable.4 However, following the Revenue Act of
1918, the Commissioner reversed his position, and the regulations pro-
vided that such gains were not taxable.5 This continued to be the
rule until 1932 when a court refused to give the regulation carte
blanche effect. In Commissioner v. S. A. Woods Machine Co.,6 the
court stated that "[w]hether the acquisition or sale by a corporation
of shares of its own capital stock gives rise to taxable gain or de-
ductible loss depends upon the real nature of the transaction
involved." 7 The court then proceeded to lay down the following
test. "If it was in fact a capital transaction, i.e., if the shares were
acquired or parted with in connection with a readjustment of the
1 "No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of
money or other property in exchange for stock (including treasury stock) of
such corporation." INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1032(a).2 Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 2 B.T.A. 130 (1925); see Emerson
Electric Mfg. Co., 3 B.T.A. 932, 935 (1926).
3 Simmons Co. v. Commissioner, 33 F.2d 75 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 280
U.S. 588 (1929); Corninj Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1929),
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 742 (1930) (Where a corporation pays a commission to
a broker or bank to aid in selling such stock, then such commission is not
deductible; it is considered as selling the stock at a discount). For an analogous
situation where such commissions are considered part of the purchase price, see
N.Y. Svocx Copp. LAW § 69.
4 See Commissioner v. Rollins Burdick Hunter Co., 174 F2d 698, 699 (7th
Cir. 1949).
5Ibid.
657 F.2d 635 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 613 (1932).
7 Id. at 636.
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capital structure of the- corporation . . . ," 8 then it is not taxable.
"But where. . a corporation has legally dealt in its own stock as
it might in the shares of another corporation, and in so -doing has
made a gain or suffered a loss, we perceive no sufficient reason why
the gain or loss should not be taken into account in computing the
taxable income." 9
In 1934, the Commissioner adopted the above test and incorpo-
rated it in the regulations.? The courts were quick to adopt this
rule." Difficulty, however, arose as to its application. The Tax
Court gave it a literal interpretation, and looked to the time of pur-
chase and the reasons surrounding it. If the stock was reacquired for
the purpose of changing the capital structure of the corporation, but
for one reason or another that purpose failed, and the stock was again
distributed at a profit, then it was not a taxable transaction.' 2  The
courts of appeals, however, refused to adopt such a narrow interpre-
tation. Instead of viewing the transaction at the time of repurchase,
they were concerned only with the subsequent distribution and
whether or not it gave rise to a change in the capital structure'? If
there were no resulting changes in the capital framework, then any
profits on the resale were subject to an income tax.14
It was because of this uncertainty and confusion that Congress
enacted Section 1032 (a) of the 1954 Code.' 5 Under this new section,
it is no longer necessary to inquire into the transaction to determine
the reasons for the repurchase, or even to determine whether there
is a change in capital. Rather, the new section is absolute on its face,
and recognizes neither a gain nor a loss resulting from the sale of
treasury stock, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the re-
purchase or the subsequent resale. Thus, the law has again done a
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 See note 4 supra.
11 The 1934 regulation was held not to be retroactive since the prior regu-
lations had acquired the force of law. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939). It was held to apply prospectively, however. Com-
missioner v. Air Reduction Co., 130 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
681 (1942). See also United States v. Stern Bros. & Co., 136 F.2d 488 (8th
Cir. 1943) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 133 F2d 582 (8th Cir. 1943).
12 See Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 169 (1944) ; Brockman
Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 168 (1943); Dr. Pepper
Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 80 (1942).
13 See Commissioner v. H. W. Porter & Co., 187 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1951);
Commissioner v. Rollins Burdick Hunter Co., 174 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1949).
However, in Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 837
(Ct. C. 1954), cert. granted, Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 1955, the court, in reviewing
the positions of the Tax Court and courts of appeals, decided in favor of the
former. The court expressed the opinion that there was some doubt as to
whether a corporation's purchasing and selling of its own stock is not really
a capital transaction.14 See note 13 supra.
I See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 426 (1954).
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complete about-face and has returned to the position adopted after the
Revenue Act of 1918.
The enactment of Section 1032 (a) marks a distinct advancement
in this field of tax law. The tax lawyer is greatly aided in that the
uncertainties have been removed and he may advise his clients with
greater certainty as to the law governing such transfers. The cor-
poration is aided in that no longer is it penalized in the form of
taxation, when, having repurchased its stock in a purely capital trans-
action, it is for some reason subsequently required to resell it.16 It
has also been suggested that the new provision will be more in keep-
ing with established accounting practices.
17
DECLARATIONS OF ESTIizATED INcOME TAX By CORPORATIONS
Under the 1954 Code, a corporation whose tax for the taxable
year "can reasonably be expected to exceed $100,000," 1 must file a
declaration of estimated tax on September 15 of the taxable year.
2
The "estimated tax" is computed by subtracting $100,000 from the
expected tax liability.3 In addition, the corporation is required to
make partial tax payments during the same taxable year, namely in
two equal installments on September 15 and December 15. 4 The
remaining tax liability is paid when the corporation files its return
on March 15 5 of the following year, or, if the corporation elects, in
two installments on March 15 and June 15. 6 The Code permits a
certain flexibility with regard to the payments during the taxable year.
Since the amount of those payments depends on the September 15
estimate, if the tax outlook should change after that date, the declara-
tion will be amended and the December 15 payment increased or de-
creased accordingly.7 Moreover, if a corporation does not, until after
16 See note 13 sunpra. See also P-H 1954 IRC VOL. 1123,003 (for a discus-
sion of the benefits received by a corporation under this section).
17 See Commissioner v. Air Reduction Co., 130 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6016(a) [applicable to all corporations "... sub-
ject to taxation under section 11 or 1201(a), or subchapter L of chapter 1
(relating to insurance companies). .. "].
2 Id. § 6074. For purposes of illustration, the dates mentioned in this article
refer to calendar-year corporations. The same rules apply to fiscal-year cor-
porations. Thus, the filing date for a fiscal-year corporation is the fifteenth
day of the ninth month of the taxable year, with the dates for tax payments
adjusted accordingly.
3 Id. § 6016(b).
4Id. §6154(b). The corporation may elect to pay these installments on
earlier dates. Id. § 6154(e).
Id. §§6072(b), 6151(a).
6Id. §§ 6152(a) (1) (B), 6152(b) (2).
7 Id. § 6154(c). Amendments can be made if the original declaration was
filed before December 15. Id. § 6074(b).
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August 31, expect a tax liability to exceed $100,000 it will merely
file its declaration on or before December 15 8 and make its full esti-
mated tax payment then.9 There is no requirement for the filing of
a declaration when a corporation does not reasonably expect, until
after December 1, that its tax liability will exceed $100,000. It should
be noted, however, that these provisions relating to declarations of
estimated tax ".... apply only with respect to taxable years ending
on or after December 31, 1955." 10
Thus Congress, for the first time, is applying to corporations a
pay-as-you-go system which, for individual taxpayers, had its incep-
tion in 1943.11 One problem involved in enacting a pay-as-you-go
system is getting the plan started: how to avoid burdening the tax-
payer with payments for the current year under the new plan in addi-
tion to the tax payments for the previous year under the prior system.
The 1943 Act solved the problem by in effect excusing, in most cases,
payment of the prior 1942 tax.12 The 1954 Code, however, excuses
no taxes, but works at a gradual shift, over a period of years, to the
pay-as-you-go system whereby the burden of extra payments is re-
duced to a minimum. For example, in 1955, a corporation (whose
tax is expected to exceed $100,000) will, in addition to paying its
1954 income tax on March 15, pay in September and December a
total of 10% of its 1955 estimated tax.13  Thus, the corporation is,
in effect, compelled to pay more than its 1954 tax liability in calendar
year 1955 (100% of the 1954 tax plus 10%o of the 1955 estimated
tax). 14 While the corporation is not actually paying an additional
tax, the plan has the effect of withdrawing its liquid assets to the
extent of 10% of its next year's estimated tax-money it could for-
merly use for current business expenses. Each successive year after
1955 the amount of tax to be paid during the taxable year is increased
8 Id. § 6074(a).
9 Id. § 6154(b).
boId. §6016(f).
I Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, 57 STAT. 126 (1943). The main pro-
visions of this Act (as amended), in regard to declarations of estimated tax
for individuals, were incorporated into Sections 58, 59 and 294 of the 1939 Code.
12 57 STAT. 145-149 (1943), repealed, 58 STAT. 73 (1944). "Since taxpayers
for the first time were expected to pay the current year's taxes from current
earnings, it was generally considered necessary to give some relief during the
conversion period. Persons having taxes in excess of $50 for 1942 paid a tax
in 1943 consisting of the greater of the 1942 or the 1943 taxes plus 25 per cent
of the lesser tax. Those individuals having a 1942 tax of less than $50 were
forgiven the lower of the 1942 or the 1943 taxes." Koch and Moore, Income
Taxes and Tlir Impact on the Individual Since 1913, 32 TAxEs 462, 464-465
(1954). See also Keesling, "The Pay-As-You-Go Plan;" 18 J.B.A. CA~rp.
224, 233-236 (1943).
I3 INT. Rxv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6154(a).
24 It should be noted that the corporation is not paying 10% of its actual
1955 tax, but 10% of its 1955 estimated tax, which includes the $100,000 exemp-
tion. Id. §6016(b).
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by 10% until 1959 when it reaches 50%.15 The transition wil be
fully accomplished in 1960, when the corporation will pay the remain-
ing 50% of its 1959 tax and 50% of its 1960 estimated tax.
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1950, a corporation paid its taxes
for the taxable year in four equal installments, on March, June, Sep-
tember and December 15 of the following year.16 In order to accel-
erate the collection of revenue, the Revenue Act of 1950 provided for
the gradual increase in the percentage of total tax payments due on
March 15 and June 15 until the September and December payments
were completely eliminated.17 This change-over from four to two in-
stallments was completed for the taxable year 1954. The 1950 Act
thus made possible the 1954 Code pay-as-you-go system which re-
quires two payments of estimated tax during the current taxable year.
Congress felt that a four-installment system, i.e., payments of the
prior year's tax in March and June and payments of the current
year's tax in September and December, makes easier the management
of the public debt. Moreover, the installment system under the Rev-
enue Act of 1950, in lumping tax payments between March and
June, aggravated "the effect of Treasury operations on the money
markets." ' 8 While corporations having an expected tax of less than
$100,000 will still continue on a two-installment system, the pay-as-
you-go plan, with four installment payments, will affect 20,000 cor-
porations accounting for 85% of corporate income taxes.19
Unlike the complicated penalties provided for pursuant to the
pay-as-you-go system for individuals under the prior Code,20 the 1954
Code merely charges corporations a 6% penalty on underpayments. 21
Moreover, the Code realistically makes allowances for business fluc-
tuations which might make it difficult to precisely predict the esti-
mated tax. Thus no penalty is imposed on underpayments if they
were based on an estimate which was not below 70% of the actual
tax.m The Code also dispenses with penalties if certain prescribed
15 Id. § 6154(a).
:16 INT. REv. COD. OF 1939, § 56(b). This section was amended by the Rev-
enue Act of 1950. See note 17 infra.
17 Revenue Act of 1950, § 205 (a), 64 STAT. 929-930 (1950). See Smx. REP.
No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) in 2 U.S. CODE CoNG. SFmv. 3053, 3069-
3071 (1951).18 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1954). Under the two-
installment system, the Government, to obtain current funds, sold interest
bearing, short-term securities to taxpaying corporations, who in buying them
in effect made advance payment of their income taxes. The four-installment
system will make funds available to the Government with less need to rely upon
sale of such securities. Ibid.19 See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1954).2 0 1INT. REy. CODE OF 1939, § 294 (d). See HMR. REs'. No. 1337, supra note
18, at 100-101 (for a discussion of the complexities of these penalty provisions).2 1 INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 6655 (a). Wilful failure to pay estimated taxes
is a misdemeanor punishable by fine (of not more than $10,000 plus the cost
of prosecution) and imprisonment (not more than one year) or both. Id. § 7203.
22 Id. § 6655 (b).
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systems are used to estimate the tax.23 Finally, while the Code pro-
vides that corporations which reasonably expect their tax liability to
exceed $100,000 must file a declaration of estimated tax, no penalty
is prescribed for failure to do so.24  The only penalty is for actual
underpayment of estimated tax.
APPORTIONMENT OF THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEmBLY
Introduction
On January 5, 1955, Governor Averell Harriman presented his
first annual message to the New York State Legislature.' In his
message, he called the legislature's attention to the glaring distortions
in the apportioning of the Assembly.2 The Governor reconmnended
".... the initiation of a Constitutional amendment to remedy the in-
justices of our present apportionment system," by apportioning mem-
bers on the basis of population.3
The present procedure for apportioning representatives in the
Assembly is governed by Article III, Sections 2 and 5 of the New
York State Constitution. Section 2 provides, in part, that "[t]he
assembly shall consist of one hundred and fifty members." 4  There
is no flexibility in the number of assemblymen to be apportioned, as
there is in the case of senators.3 This restrictive provision, as will
23 Thus, no penalty for underpayment is assessed if the estimated tax upon
which the payments were based: (1) amounts to the previous year's tax (minus
$100,000) ; or (2) equals what would have been the previous year's tax liability
(minus $100,000) if it were computed according to current tax rates; or
(3) equals at least 70% (after subtracting $100,000) of the tax that would be
due on the basis of current income up to a specified cut-off date. Id. § 6655 (d).
24 See 4 CCH 1955 FED. TAx. REP. 1 5552. Section 294(d) (1) (A) of the
1939 Code prescribed penalties for failure to file a declaration of estimated
income.
1 1955 LEG. Doc. No. 1.
2 The Governor posed as an example of such distortion the fact that
"Schenectady County contains ten times as many citizens as Schuyler County,
yet each is represented by a single Assemblyman." Id. at 21.
3Id. at 21.
4 N.Y. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2.
5 Article III, Section 2 of the New York State Constitution provides that
the Senate shall consist of fifty members, except that an. increase in this num-
ber may be allowed in accordance with the provisions of Section 4, where
".... any county having three or more senators .. . shall be entitled.. . to
an additional senator [for each full ratio over three]." See Matter of Dowling,
219 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E. 545 (1916).
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